

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Chief, Security Control Staff

DATE: 9 July 1948

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FROM : [REDACTED] Control Officer

SUBJECT: SCS Study re. CIA Relationships with SANACC - Security Advisory Board

THE PROBLEM

1. On its own initiative, to recommend whether:

a. CIA should designate a representative or observer to the Security Advisory Board, SANACC;

b. CIA should take an active interest in the program of the Security Advisory Board;

c. I. & S. should utilize the services of the Security Officers of the various non-IAC agencies.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

2. The Security Advisory Board of the State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee in general advises non-military federal departments and agencies on security regulations including the minimum standards for security clearance of personnel having access to TOP SECRET and SECRET information. It is specifically charged with the drafting of rules as to the handling of confidential documents in connection with the President's loyalty order of March, 1947.

3. According to the information available in the SCS files, CIA's present connection with the Board is limited to the listing of the Chief, Security Branch as the Security Officer for the CIA. Previously, liaison officers from the Security Branch of OCD were nominally assigned to the Security Advisory Board, but this activity apparently was not encouraged for fear of Security Advisory Board's "penetration" into CIA or for other reasons not apparent from the files.

4. The National Security Act of 1947 provides for CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council,

"to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities. Provided ****."

In addition, the AD/OCD has authorized the dissemination of CIA intelligence to non-IAC agencies, which are also non-military agencies as defined by the Security Advisory Board.

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5. A DCI memorandum of 7 October 1947 to AD/OCD outlines the security policy for dissemination of written intelligence material to departments and agencies other than IAC agencies. In brief, it authorizes dissemination of confidential CIA material to Liaison Clearing Authority of non-IAC agencies; requires specific directions from I. & S. for the dissemination of more highly classified materials to these individuals; and requires specific clearance from I. & S. for dissemination of material classified higher than RESTRICTED to individuals beside the Liaison Clearing Authorities. In addition, the Executive for I. & S. approves or disapproves proposed recipients and makes security surveys of recipient agencies.

6. Parallel, duplicate or overlapping functions are performed by Security Advisory Board and other groups as follows:

a. Security Advisory Board memorandum No. 3, dated 4 October 1946, provides in Paragraph 4 thereof:

"Final determination of the suitability from a security standpoint of an individual to receive TOP SECRET and SECRET information shall be the responsibility of the Security Officer of the department or agency, or other responsible official heretofore given that responsibility by the agency or department."

By virtue of this memorandum it is conceivable that I. & S. may approve a recipient in an agency from a security viewpoint to receive SECRET material, whereas this same individual may be disapproved for the same classification by the Security Officer of the agency, or vice versa. SCS files do not reflect coordination with Security Officers in these matters.

b. The Security Advisory Board circulates security regulations to Security Officers of non-military federal departments and agencies as a guide in security matters. Conflicts in security procedure can and have taken place. For example, the Security Advisory Board provides for the dissemination of JANIS studies to be made in accordance with the Security Advisory Board rules and upon the dissemination requirements of the Security Officers of the several departments. Under I. & S. procedures, JANIS studies presumably will be distributed through the Liaison Clearing Authority, without the knowledge of the Security Officer unless the two individuals happen to be the same person.

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c. Under Security Advisory Board guidance, Security Officers undoubtedly make security surveys of their various offices. I. & S. likewise makes security surveys of agencies receiving CIA material. These security surveys ordinarily are made without the knowledge or cooperation of the Security Officer. Reversing the process, it would be a similar practice if the Security Officer of the Commerce Department made a security survey of OCD without the knowledge of I. & S. Clearly, CIA is on tenuous ground and subject to criticism by Security Advisory Board and the various Security Officers.

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d. Joint Security Control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulates security policies which may affect CIA documents. For example, the Joint Security Control is presently attempting to reach an agreement [REDACTED] on the release of captured enemy documents to the public. This proposed agreement will be channeled to Joint Security Control and SANACC-Security Advisory Board for approval. Without at least a voice at the Security Advisory Board, CIA's interests are protected only by the chance invitations of other groups.

7. The files indicate that the security surveys made of other agencies are, at best, one-shot jobs which cover only the salient features of a security survey. Thereafter, the protection of CIA material must depend on local regulations as promulgated by the Security Advisory Board and enforced by the Security Officer. It would appear logical, therefore, for CIA to strengthen the protection of the material in the agencies by utilizing the services of Security Advisory Board to correct, implement or establish security safeguards and to use the services of the Security Officers to carry out CIA wishes regarding the security aspects of its material while in the custody of another agency. The practice of using other agencies' security services would become more desirable, more valuable and less cumbersome than the present method as the amount of material disseminated from CIA to the non-IAC agencies increases in volume. Likewise, this procedure would be more in accord with the spirit of the National Security Act of 1947, which provides for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities.

8. Finally, it is felt that the present procedures with regard to the dissemination of CIA intelligence material to non-IAC agencies must eventually be liberalized to place a greater burden for the safeguarding of CIA interest on the Security Officers of the various non-IAC agencies and less responsibility on the Liaison Clearing Authorities.

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The average Liaison Clearing Authority is not qualified, nor has he the time to spend on proper security practices, whereas it is the primary task of the agency Security Officer. A closer relationship, therefore, with agency Security Officers and with the Security Advisory Board should be developed for the greater security benefit of CIA.

CONCLUSIONS

9. CIA is not using the services of the Security Advisory Board and of the Security Officers of the various non-IAC agencies to the extent required by its relations with other agencies on security matters.


RECOMMENDATIONS:

10. It is recommended that:

a. CIA take steps to designate a representative, liaison officer or observer to the Security Advisory Board authorized to take an active interest in its program;

b. Members of the SCS, I. & S. establish a firm contact with, and use, the services of Security Officers of all non-IAC agencies receiving CIA classified material to assure maximum protection to CIA classified material and to afford greater flexibility in security liaison work.

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